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THE NEW AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA SERVICES DIRECTIVE: 
TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS, TELEVISION WITHOUT 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY
MIRA BURRI-NENOVA*
1. Introduction
To see one’s favourite TV show nowadays, one no longer needs to sit punctu-
ally in front of the screen at the hour specified in the TV schedule. Indeed, 
there are now numerous other options, such as pre-ordering the show via 
one’s mobile or the Internet to be viewed on IPTV (internet protocol televi-
sion1) at a convenient time, recording it on a digital video recorder, web-
streaming it from the Internet or downloading it to a mobile phone, iPod or 
similar portable device. Not only that, but one can also skip the often too-
long commercial breaks or order previous, missed or particularly worth-see-
ing episodes of the show.
To the casual observer, this wide range of options may seem like 
just  another series of business tricks intended to lure customers into 
spending more money. The more perceptive and technologically  savvy 
observer,  however, would notice some distinct features of these sce-
narios. Besides  shattering the reality of the “couch potato”, they are 
all examples of the  practical implementation of the digitization2 and 
* Alternate leader of the research project “eDiversity: The Legal Protection of Cultural Di-
versity in a Digital Networked Environment”, part of the Swiss National Centre of Competence 
in Research (NCCR): Trade Regulation. This paper would not have been possible without the 
previous work done by Christoph Beat Graber, as well as his valuable comments. The author 
further thanks Susan Kaplan for improving the language. Please note that all websites were last 
accessed 15 Oct. 2007, unless otherwise specified.
1. On IPTV, see Horlings, Marsden, van Oranje and Botterman, “Contribution to  Impact 
Assessment of the Revision of the Television without Frontiers Directive”, Report Prepared for 
DG Information Society and Media of the European Commission, RAND  Europe, TR-334-EC 
DG, 1 Nov. 2005, at p. 5; Marsden, Cave, Nason, Parkinson, Blackman and Rutter, “Assessing 
Indirect Impacts of the EC Proposals for Video Regulation”, Report Prepared for the United 
Kingdom Office of Communications, RAND Europe, 2006, at pp. 55–78.
2. In its simplest form, a digital code is a binary bit or digit indicating one of two  alternatives 
(represented as either 0 or 1) to denote the presence or absence of an electrical signal or two dif-
ferent voltage levels. Binary bits can be grouped in various combinations to represent numbers, 
alphabetical characters, symbols or any other type of information. Through a combination of 
microprocessors and sophisticated algorithms, these bit streams can then be compressed to man-
ageable lengths, therewith allowing a wide range of content to be stored, retrieved and transport-
ed electronically in the form of encoded text, audio and video traffic over any digital network.
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convergence3 processes, which have obliterated the boundaries between me-
dia, telecommunications and information technology sectors and moulded 
new patterns of consumer and business behaviour. These scenarios also reveal 
the massive degree of penetration of the digitization/convergence phenomena 
into our everyday lives and our decreasing defiance of the ubiquity of ones 
and zeroes.4
Before attempting an analysis of the regulatory implications of novel tech-
nological developments in the media, which is one of the objectives pursued 
by the present article, it should be noted that both digitization and conver-
gence have progressed immensely in the last five years. As far as digitization 
is concerned, Moore’s law5 has remained valid and the potential of micropro-
cessors has continued to increase at a rapid pace, allowing the processing and 
storage of vast amounts of information (be it audio, video or text). Further-
more, the breadth and capacity of networks have substantially been enhanced6 
and almost all networks (in developed and even in developing countries) have 
become IP-based.7 In its totality, these developments have allowed for swift 
data transmission and have thereby changed existing business and consumer 
behaviour models.8 Convergence, as a process stemming from digitization,9 
has also reached a new level of advancement. The long heralded merging of 
telecommunications, media and information technology services, networks 
and market players has become reality, as we saw above (albeit not in the 
3. On convergence, see Blackman, “Convergence between telecommunications and other 
media” (1998) Telecommunications Policy, 163–170; Longstaff, “New ways to think about the 
visions called ‘convergence’: A guide for business and public policy”, Program on Information 
Resources Policy, Harvard University, April 2000; OECD, “The implications of convergence for 
regulation of electronic communications”, DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2003)5/final, 12 July 2004; Gera-
din and Luff (Eds.), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual 
Services (Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially therein Mueller, “Convergence: A real-
ity check”, pp. 311–322 and Larouche, “Dealing with convergence at the international level”, 
pp. 390–422.
4. See e.g. OECD, “The future digital economy: Digital content creation, distribution and 
access”, DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)2/ANN, 22 May 2006.
5. Gordon Moore of Intel postulated in 1965 that the transistor density on a single integrated 
circuit microchip would double approximately every eighteen months. This rule showing the 
incredible pace of technological advance became known as Moore’s law. On Moore’s law, see 
e.g. Frieden, Managing the Internet-Driven Change in International Telecommunications (Bos-
ton/London, Artech House, 2001), at pp. 17 et seq.
6. Metcalfe’s law holds that the potential value of network increases by the square of the 
number of nodes, while the Fibre Law holds that capacity doubles every 9 months. See e.g. 
Marsden et al., supra note 1, at pp. 72 et seq.
7. I.e. internet protocol-based: OECD, Information Technology Outlook 2006 (Paris: OECD, 
2007).
8. Ibid.
9. See Mueller, ”Digital Convergence and its Consequences: a Report on the Digital Conver-
gence and Market Structures”, 1999, available at <dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/rp1.pdf>
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originally predicted shape and form10). There is now a real supply and, what 
is more important, a demand for converged services.11 Particularly on the 
broadband Internet, different media, such as video gaming, music, streamed 
radio and online newspapers have proliferated and are widely accepted as 
substitutes for traditional analogue media.12 Beyond this, there is a new gen-
eration of Internet-based services (such as social networking sites, blogs and 
wikis13) − the so-called Web 2.014 − which emphasize online collaboration 
and content creation, to enrich and stimulate the communication environ-
ment.15
Among the various consequences of the advanced digitization/conver-
gence, we consider the magnified importance of content as the core one.16 
A second notable implication concerns the new ways of accessing and con-
suming content, which also lead to new ways of creating it. Although in the 
audiovisual media, the progress of digitization/convergence has been less pro-
nounced (especially if compared with the most advanced convergence plat-
form of the Internet), we argue in this article that its repercussions could be 
the most far-reaching. The availability of multiple new channels for distribu-
tion of content (and of new content), the new opportunities for consumers to 
access and interact, and the repositioning of global market players along the 
entire value chain of content creation, packaging and distribution, strongly 
10. See Longstaff, supra note 3.
11. The lack of demand for converged services was one of the reasons for the “bursting” of 
the dotcom bubble in 2001. See The Economist, “Beyond the Bubble”, 9 Oct. 2003. 
12. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 6.
13. Social networking sites are websites, where communities of people who share interests 
or activities can interact using various web-based tools, such as chat, messaging, video, file 
sharing, discussion groups, etc. Blogs (or web blogs) are websites, where entries are written in 
chronological order and displayed in reverse chronological order. Blogs can combine text, im-
ages and links, and provide commentaries or news on a particular subject, or function as personal 
online diaries with possibilities for comments and interaction. Wikis are web applications allow-
ing multiple authors to add, remove and edit content.
14. Web 2.0 is a phrase coined by O’Reilly Media (www.oreilly.com/) in 2004. Proponents 
of the Web 2.0 concept say that it differs from early Web development (labelled Web 1.0) in 
that it moves away from static websites, the use of search engines and surfing from one website 
to the next, towards a more dynamic and interactive World Wide Web. See O’Reilly, “What Is 
Web 2.0?”, available at <www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-
20.html>. See also OECD, “Participative web: User-created content”, DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/
FINAL, 12 April 2007.
15. See Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom (Yale University Press, 2006). See also Jenkins, Convergence Culture: How Old and 
New Media Collide (New York University Press, 2006).
16. See OECD op. cit., supra note 7. See also OECD, “Digital broadband content: Digital 
strategies and policies”, DSTI/ICCP/IE(2005)3/FINAL, 19 May 2006 and OECD op. cit., supra 
note 4.
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influence all media and their role in modern society. Such possibilities fun-
damentally change the character of communication and impinge upon our 
culture.17
In a world of profound changes and dynamism, what has remained surpris-
ingly unaffected is regulation. Particularly in respect of the audiovisual me-
dia, there have been literally no changes to the regulatory framework since the 
onset of convergence and despite the substantial modifications in the parallel 
telecommunications regime.18 In the European Union, the new Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive (AVMS), proposed by the European Commission 
on 13 December 2005,19 should allegedly rectify this situation. Amending the 
existing Television without Frontiers Directive (TVWF),20 it should offer a 
“fresh approach”21 and meet the challenge of appropriately regulating media 
in a complex and dynamic environment. It is meant to achieve a balance be-
tween the free circulation of TV broadcast and new audiovisual media and the 
preservation of values of cultural identity and diversity, while respecting the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality inherent to the European Com-
munity.22
The main purpose of the present article is to examine whether and how the 
changes envisaged to the EC audiovisual media regime might influence cul-
tural diversity in Europe and, subsequently, address the question of whether 
the AVMS appropriately safeguards the balance between competition and the 
public interest in this regard.
17. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: The Rise of the 
Network Society, 2nd ed. (Blackwell, 2000), at p. 356. Castells noted that, “[t]he potential integra-
tion of text, images, and sounds in the same system, interacting from multiple points, in chosen 
time (real and delayed) along a global network, in conditions of open and affordable access, does 
fundamentally change the character of communication. And communication decisively shapes 
culture…”.
18. On the developments of EC telecommunications law, see Nihoul and Rodford, EU Elec-
tronic Communications Law (OUP, 2004); Walden and Angel (Eds.), Telecommunications Law 
and Regulation, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2005).
19. Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down 
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Televi-
sion Broadcasting Activities, COM(2005)646 final, 13 Dec. 2005. See also Commission Staff 
Working Document, Annex to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC, SEC(2005)1625/2, 13 Dec. 2005.
20. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 Oct. 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions 
Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pur-
suit of Television Broadcasting Activities, O.J. 1989, L 298/23.
21. Proposal for a Directive, supra note 19, at p. 2.
22. See Art. 5(3) EC and the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Attached to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, O.J. 1997, C 340/1.
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The article tackles these issues in four parts. The first outlines with a few 
broad brushstrokes the development of the EC audiovisual media regulation 
and its main tenets. The second part draws upon this background and discuss-
es the proposed changes thereto. Part three examines their potential impact 
on cultural diversity in Europe and questions the concept of cultural diversity 
used by the Commission as a policy goal. Part four draws conclusions and 
suggests that the AVMS does not appropriately address the new media en-
vironment, and the balance between competition and cultural diversity as a 
legitimate public interest objective may be endangered through its implemen-
tation.
2. Overview of the development of EC audiovisual media regulation
Broadcasting was not one of the original regulatory domains of the EC and 
was not covered by the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community in 1957. It was only with the Maastricht Treaty,23 which entered 
into force on 1 November 1993 that the audiovisual sector was referred to 
explicitly, although arguably different rules of the emerging body of Com-
munity law touched upon diverse aspects of media regulation even before the 
change took place.24
The attempts to shape a distinct EC audiovisual policy began before the 
Maastricht Treaty, however. They were triggered mostly by endogenous fac-
tors, which were epitomized by the development of satellite broadcasting, the 
23. The Maastricht Treaty inserted a new Title IX into the structure of the Treaty of Rome. 
It bore the broad rubric of “Culture” and included one article – Art. 128, which is now, since 
the Amsterdam renumbering, Art. 151 EC. Art. 151 entails an obligation for the Community to 
“contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national 
and regional diversity”. Following the principle of subsidiarity, the Community is to encourage 
cooperation between Member States but could, if necessary, supplement their action in certain 
fields, notably, “artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector”. Art. 151(4) 
EC specifies further that the Community must take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions of the Treaty. For a comprehensive analysis of Art. 151 EC, see Craufurd 
Smith (Ed.), Culture and European Union Law (OUP, 2004). On the duties of the EC institutions 
in the field of culture, see de Witte, “Trade in culture: International legal regimes and EU consti-
tutional values” in de Búrca and Scott (Eds.), The EU and the WTO – Legal and Constitutional 
Issues (Hart, 2003), pp. 237–255.
24. The ECJ played an important role in expanding the scope of activities falling under the 
Community’s prerogative. Since Sacchi, it is clear that the broadcasting of televised messages 
falls under the rules of the Treaty relating to the provision of services. See Case 155/73, Gui-
seppe Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409. See also Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Marc J V C Debauve 
and others, [1980] ECR 860; Case 62/79, Coditel v. Ciné-Vog Films (Coditel I), [1980] ECR 
881 and Case 262/81, Coditel v. Ciné-Vog Films (Coditel II), [1982] ECR 3381.
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proliferation of TV broadcasters and the rapidly increasing deficit with the 
US in audiovisual trade. The Green Paper on the Establishment of a Common 
Market in Broadcasting of 198425 marked the beginning of the Community’s 
audiovisual media policy. The latter advanced in parallel to but independent-
ly26 of the undertakings of the Council of Europe (CoE). The Council of Eu-
rope had indeed a longer established stance on media matters.27 It was also 
the first to adopt a regulatory act to that effect with the Convention on Trans-
frontier Television (CTT).28 
The Community decided to follow the blueprint of the CTT.29 Consequent-
ly, Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions 
Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States 
Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities,30 which was ad-
opted in 1989, mirrors to a great extent the structure and the basic provisions 
of the CTT.31 Since the beginning of the 1990s,32 this Directive,33 commonly 
25. Commission, Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Com-
mon Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM(84)300, May 1984. For 
the developments leading to the adoption of the TVWF, see Levy, Europe’s Digital Revolution: 
Broadcasting and Regulation, the EU and the Nation State (Routledge, 1999), at pp. 41–43.
26. Graber, “Kulturpolitische Auswirkungen eines Schweizer Beitritts zur Europäischen 
Union – Untersucht am Beispiel des Film- und Fernsehrechts“ in Cottier and Kopše (Eds.), 
Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union: Brennpunkte und Auswirkungen (Schulthess, 
1998), pp. 987–1024, at p. 995.
27. The endeavours of the CoE to adopt a binding legal instrument covering certain cultural 
aspects of transfrontier broadcasting began in the early 1980s. Various steps followed, which 
found expression in a number of recommendations. For an account, see Explanatory Report to 
the European Convention on Transfrontier Television (ETS No 132), Strasbourg, 5 May 1989, as 
amended by the provisions of the Protocol (ETS No 171), which entered into force on 1 March 
2002.
28. CoE, European Convention on Transfrontier Television (ETS No 132), Strasbourg, 5 May 
1989. The CTT was opened for signature by the CoE Member States and other States Party to the 
European Cultural Convention (ETS No 018), Paris, 19 Dec. 1954.
29. See European Council Decisions of 2 and 3 Dec. 1988, Rhodes, in Bull. EC, No 12/1988, 
at para 1.1.9.
30. See supra note 20.
31. The CTT provides a minimum of common rules in fields such as programming, advertis-
ing and the protection of certain individual rights. It entrusts the transmitting States with the task 
of ensuring that the TV programme services transmitted comply with its provisions. In return, 
freedom of reception of programme services is guaranteed, as well as the retransmission of the 
programmes which comply with the minimum rules of the Convention.
32. Pursuant to Art. 25 TVWF, Member States were obliged to bring their laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions into conformity with the Directive by 3 Oct. 1991.
33. Updated and revised through Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 June 1997 Amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC, O.J. 1997, L 202/60. In the 
course of this paper, we shall refer to the consolidated version of Directive 89/552/EEC and 
Directive 97/36/EC.
Audiovisual media 1695
known as the Television without Frontiers Directive, has provided the essen-
tial regulatory framework for television broadcasting and related activities at 
the Community level. As the prime EC regulatory tool for audiovisual media, 
the TVWF will be at the heart of our enquiry.
The TVWF can be best described as a liberalization measure. It is in es-
sence a concretization of the freedom of services under the specific con-
ditions of television, including a minimum level of partial harmonization,34 
which ensures the conditions necessary and sufficient for the consolidation 
of the single market for media services.35 As a piece of secondary law, the 
Directive follows the basic principles of freedom to provide services and 
freedom of establishment.36 Article 2(a) TVWF explicitly guarantees these 
freedoms and provides that no Member State can restrict reception or retrans-
mission of a broadcast from another Member State for reasons falling within 
the areas coordinated by the Directive. The TVWF regulates four major areas 
that cover: (i) the promotion of European works37 and works by independent 
producers;38 (ii) advertising, teleshopping and sponsoring;39 (iii) the protec-
tion of minors and public order;40 and (iv) the right of reply.41 The TVWF, in 
the amended version of 1997,42 ensures further that events which are regarded 
by a Member State as being of major importance to society (such as, most 
manifestly, the Football World Cup), may not be broadcast in such a way (e.g. 
on pay-TV only), as to deprive a substantial part of the population of that 
Member State of the opportunity to watch them.43
The core principle of application of the lex specialis TVWF rules is the 
so-called “country of origin” rule (also referred to as “home State” or “send-
ing State” rule), whereby each Member State must ensure that all televi-
34. Joined Cases C-34, 35 & 36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini (Sven-
ska) Förlag AB and TV-Shop I Sverige AB, [1997] ECR I-3843, at para 32. See also Drijber, 
“The revised Television without Frontiers Directive: Is it fit for the next century” 36 CML Rev. 
(1999), 87–122, at 92. On the different types of harmonization in EC law, see Slot, “Harmonisa-
tion”, 21 EL Rev. (1996), 378–396.
35. See Case C-412/93, Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA 
and M6 Publicité SA, [1995] ECR I-179, at paras. 28–29 and De Agostini, supra note 34 at paras. 
24–28. See also Wheeler, “Supranational regulation: Television and the European Union” (2004) 
European Journal of Communication, 349–369, at 351–357.
36. See Arts. 43 and 49 EC. See also supra note 24.
37. Arts. 4 and 6 TVWF.
38. Art. 5 TVWF.
39. Arts. 10–20 TVWF.
40. Arts. 22, 22(a) and 22(b) TVWF.
41. Art. 23 TVWF. Teleshopping rules were added by the 1997 amendment of the TVWF.
42. See supra note 33.
43. Art. 3(a) TVWF.
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sion broadcasters under its jurisdiction comply.44 Member State jurisdiction 
is defined through the principle of country of establishment with specific 
practical criteria applying to its precise determination (e.g. head office of 
the service provider; place where programming policy decisions are taken).45 
Each broadcaster falls under the jurisdiction of one Member State only and it 
is sufficient that the broadcasters comply with the law of the Member State 
from which they emanate.46 The receiving State cannot exercise secondary 
control47 except under special, restrictively interpreted,48 derogations (such 
as the protection of minors or prevention of incitement to hatred).49 It should 
not, however, be forgotten that the TVWF defines only a minimum set of 
common rules and Member States are free to impose more detailed or stricter 
rules upon broadcasters under their jurisdiction.50
With the benefit of hindsight and summarizing the 17 years of application 
of the TVWF, one can argue that the TVWF has been a clear success. It has 
contributed to overcoming the existing fragmentation of national laws and, 
by facilitating the free circulation of television broadcasts, has fostered the 
European audiovisual media industry. The numbers contained in the recent 
Commission report on the implementation of the TVWF51 are unambiguous 
evidence in this regard: whereas, at the beginning of 2001, over 660 channels 
with potential national coverage were broadcast via terrestrial transmitters, 
satellite or cable,52 three years later over 860 such channels were active in 
the EU15.53 This should be compared to the fewer than 90(!) channels exist-
ing in 1989.54 As the number of channels has grown, so have the revenues of 
44. Art. 2 TVWF.
45. See Art. 2(3)–(5) TVWF. For the relevant case law, see Drijber, supra note 34, at pp. 92–
97.
46. See Case C-11/95, Commission v. Belgium, [1996] ECR I-4115, at para 34 and Case 
14/96, Criminal Proceedings against Paul Denuit, [1997] ECR I-2785, at paras. 32–34. For the 
limitations of the transmitting State principle, see De Agostini, supra note 34, at paras. 33–35.
47. De Agostini, ibid.
48. See e.g. Case C-348/96, Calfa, [1999] ECR I-0011, at paras. 21 and 23. For a more ex-
tensive overview of the case law, see Drijber, op. cit. supra note 34 at  98–104 and the annotation 
of De Agostini by Stuyck in 34 CML Rev. (1997), 1445–1468.
49. See Art. 2(a)(2) TVWF.
50. See Art. 3(1) TVWF.
51. Commission, Fifth Report on the Application of Directive 89/552/EEC “Television with-
out Frontiers”, COM(2006)49 final, 10 Feb. 2006.
52. Ibid., referring to the European Audiovisual Observatory, 2001 Yearbook.
53. Ibid., referring to the European Audiovisual Observatory, 2004 Yearbook.
54. Papathanassopoulos, European Television in the Digital Age (Cambridge, Polity, 2002), 
at p. 14.
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broadcasters, which now make a substantial contribution to overall economic 
growth.55
Yet, although these data show what the European Commission likes to 
describe as a flourishing content industry,56 there is a flipside to the coin. 
Deregulation of TV markets has had multiple, less glamorous, effects.57 The 
quantity of imported programmes and their costs have soared.58 Beyond this, 
and more importantly, the quality and the range of programmes on offer have 
been radically altered.59 The pursuit of a maximization of profits and a mini-
mization of financial risks has resulted in much “imitation, blandness and the 
recycling of those genres, themes and approaches regarded as profitable”.60 
The formats and contents of TV programmes, films and shows have become 
increasingly homogeneous.61 The traditional function of television, to inform, 
has been twisted and has led to a “tabloidization of news”62 and infotain-
55. Public service broadcasters in the EU25 zone had total revenues of ¤ 29.1 billion in 2003, 
whereas private broadcasters recorded revenues totalling ¤ 18.3 billion. Pay-TV and package 
subscriptions increased their revenues to an overall amount of ¤ 13.6 billion in 2003. See Com-
mission, Fifth Report, supra note 51, referring to the European Audiovisual Observatory, 2005 
Yearbook.
56. Commission, The Commission Proposal for a Modernisation of the Television without 
Frontiers Directive, MEMO/06/208, Brussels, 18 May 2006, at p. 1.
57. For an overview, see Papathanassopoulos, op. cit. supra note 54, pp. 9–32.
58. Papathanassopoulos, ibid. at pp. 17–18.
59. Papathanassopoulos, ibid. at pp. 18–19, referring to Blumler, “Vulnerable values at 
stake” in Blumler (Ed.), Television and the Public Interest: Vulnerable Values in Western Europe-
an Broadcasting (London, Sage, 1992), pp. 22–24; Achile and Miège, “The limits of adaptation 
strategies of European public service television”, (1994) Media, Culture and Society, 31–46.
60. Papathanassopoulos, ibid. at p. 19, referring to McQuail, “Commercialisation and Be-
yond” in McQuail and Siune (Eds.), Media Policy: Convergence, Concentration and Commerce 
(London, Sage, 1998), pp. 107–127, at pp. 119–120 and Ouilette and Lewis, “Moving beyond 
the ‘vast wasteland’: Cultural policy and television in the United States”, (2000) Television and 
New Media, 95–115, at p. 96. See also Webster, Theories of Information Society (Routledge, 
1995), at p. 22. On the “multi-channel paradox”, whereby despite the diversity of channels, there 
is no actual diversity of content, see Ariño, “Competition law and pluralism in European digital 
broadcasting: Addressing the gaps“ (2004) Communications and Strategies, 97–128, at pp. 98 
et seq.
61. For a critique of the cultural industries and on the homogeneity of content, see Graber, 
Handel und Kultur im Audiovisionsrecht der WTO. Völkerrechtliche, ökonomische und kultur-
politische Grundlagen einer globalen Medienordnung (Staempfli, 2003), at pp. 18 et seq. For 
counter arguments, see Romano, “Technologische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklungen 
der audiovisuellen Medienmärkte in den letzten Jahren” in Graber, Girsberger and Nenova, Free 
Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO Negotiations in the Field of Audiovisual Services (Schul-
thess, 2004), pp. 1–13, at pp. 4 et seq.
62. Papathanassopoulos, op. cit. supra note 54, at pp. 20–23. See also Esser, “‘Tabloidiza-
tion’ of news: A comparative analysis of Anglo-American and German press journalism” (1999) 
European Journal of Communication, 291–324.
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ment.63 The competitive pressure has also changed the position of public ser-
vice broadcasters and initiated a process of convergence of the public and the 
commercial systems, in particular with respect to their programming output.64
Against this backdrop, one could suggest that whilst the TVWF has been 
a “victory for commercial forces and those who favoured anti-protectionist 
policies”,65 it has done little for the achievement of cultural goals. Although, 
as mentioned above, the TVWF followed the CTT,66 the two acts had es-
sentially different bases. While the latter initiative of the CoE had as its un-
derlying rationale the freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 10 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights,67 the Community act has been pri-
marily a single market measure.68 It is based upon Articles 47(2) and 55 EC 
(ex 57(2) and 66) and is a harmonization instrument meant to ensure that the 
free movements of establishment and services are not unduly restricted.69
The intrinsic duality of audiovisual services as having both an economic 
and a cultural nature, albeit repeatedly stated by the Community institutions,70 
could not be properly reflected at the EC level. The conflicting values and 
objectives belonging to distinct differentiated societal spheres71 could not be 
appropriately resolved through the chosen legal model. This became appar-
ent not only in the provisions of the TVWF, but was also later revealed by 
the failed attempt to adopt a Directive regulating media ownership.72 The 
“[t]ensions between ‘the economic aims of completing the single market 
[and] … the concern to protect cultural identity and a pluralist media’ further 
complicate the more conventional EU conflicts between interventionists and 
63. Franklin, Newszak and News Media (London, Arnold, 1997), at p. 4.
64. Papathanassopoulos, supra note 54, at p. 19, referring to Pfetsch, “Convergence through 
privatization? Changing media environments and televised politics in Germany” (1996) Euro-
pean Journal of Communications, 427–451, at 428–429.
65. Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, The Internationalisation of Television (London, Pin-
ter, 1990), at p. 76.
66. The ECJ has even held that the CTT and its explanatory memorandum can be used to 
clarify the interpretation of the TVWF. See Joined Cases C-320, 328, 329, 337, 338 & 339/94 
Reti Televisive Italiane SpA (RTI), Radio Torre, Rete A Srl, Vallau Italiana Promomarket Srl, 
Radio Italia Solo Musica Srl and Others, and GETE Srl v. Ministero delle Poste e Telecomuni-
cazioni, [1996] ECR I-6471, at para 33.
67. ECHR as amended by Protocol No 11, ETS No 155.
68. Graber, supra note 26, at pp. 996–998.
69. See supra note 35.
70. See infra section 5.
71. See Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, “Regime-collisions: The vain search for legal unity in 
the fragmentation of global law”, (2004) Michigan Journal of International Law, 999–1046.
72. See Levy, op. cit. supra note 25, at pp. 50–59. See also Westphal, “Media pluralism and 
European regulation”, (2002) European Business Law Review, 459–487, at 461–467.
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liberalizers, and between integrationalist and intergovernmental approaches”73 
and render a coherent media regulation at the Community level unattainable. 
Paradoxically, it has been the EC competition rules (in the sense of economic 
regulation), applying both in the fields of media and telecommunications,74 
that by fighting the concentration in these markets, safeguarded a certain 
level of content diversity.75 In the next sections, we shall see whether the new 
EC act regulating audiovisual media will be better able to meet the public in-
terest goal of protecting the diversity of cultural expressions and whether the 
Community has indeed properly defined this goal.
3. The need for a change and steps leading to the AVMS
The TVWF Directive incorporated an obligation for the Community to review 
it by 2002.76 This was however not the sole reason that prompted the revision. 
Neither can the reason be found in some of the shortcomings of the TVWF 
as an instrument for regulating European audiovisual media, as hinted above. 
Rather, the reason for a change was exogenous to the legal model and endog-
enous to the audiovisual environment. The development and application of 
digital technologies, combined with strong convergence effects, as sketched 
at the beginning of the article, have radically and irreversibly transformed 
the media landscape. They have also triggered some specific developments 
in broadcasting markets, such as: (i) increased pay-per-view; (ii) new non-
linear services delivery (e.g. video-on-demand); (iii) peer-to-peer exchanges 
73. Hitchens, “Identifying European Community audio-visual policy in the dawn of the In-
formation Society” in Yearbook of Media and Entertainment Law 1996 (OUP, 1997), at pp. 71–
72, as referred to by Levy, op. cit. supra note 25, at p. 40. See also in the same sense, Wheeler, 
op. cit. supra note 35.
74. See e.g. the 2006 decision of the Commission to bring court proceedings against Sweden 
for its failure to change rules giving the State-owned company Boxer TV Access a monopoly over 
the provision of access control services in the Swedish digital terrestrial broadcasting network. 
The case is based upon Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 Sept. 2002 on Competition in 
the Markets for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, O.J. 2002, L 249/21. See 
Commission, “Competition: Commission takes Sweden to Court for failure to end broadcasting 
services monopoly”, IP/06/1411, 17 Oct. 2006.
75. See e.g. Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 Declaring a Concentration to be com-
patible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M. 2876 – News-
corp/Telepiù), C(2003) 1082 final, 2 April 2003. Previous cases on media concentration include 
Case No IV/M.110, ABC/Generale des aux/Canal+/WH Smith, O.J. 1991, C 244/06; Case No 
IV/M.469, MSG Media Service, O.J. 1994, L 364; Case No IV/M.490, Nordic Satellite Distribu-
tion, O.J. 1995, L 53; Case No IV/M.553, RTL/Veronica/Endemol, O.J. 1996, L 294; Case No 
IV/M.993, DFI/Premiere, O.J. 1997, C 374/4.
76. See Art. 25(a) TVWF.
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of audiovisual content; (iv) changed viewer habits; and (v) new advertising 
methods. Together, these phenomena and processes called for a modernized 
legal framework to fit the new reality of European broadcasting.77
Despite the wide agreement on the need for a change, the revision of the 
TVWF has not been a smooth but rather a rough ride. It was an essential part 
of the overall reform, launched by the Green Paper on Convergence in 1999,78 
in reaction to the turbulently developing, technologically driven sectors of 
telecommunications, information technologies and audiovisual media. The 
reform of the media sector was indeed the last building block in this major 
undertaking of the Community, which is also endowed with a specific role in 
the context of the Lisbon strategy to establish the EU as the “most competi-
tive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”.79
The actual review process of the TVWF commenced with the Fourth Com-
munication on the application of the TVWF Directive for the period 2001–
2002.80 In an annex to this Communication, the Commission proposed a work 
programme for the modernization of audiovisual services rules and a time-
table of future actions.81 The subsequent efforts82 focused upon six priority 
areas, namely: (i) rules applicable to audiovisual content services (scope); 
(ii) cultural diversity and promotion of European and independent audio-
visual production; (iii) media pluralism; (iv) commercial communications; 
77. See Horlings et al., supra note 1, at pp. 3–20.
78. Commission, Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and 
Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation: Towards an Informa-
tion Society Approach, COM(97)623 final, 3 Dec. 1997. See also Commission communica-
tion on Principles and Guidelines for the Community’s Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age, 
COM(1999)657 final, 14 Dec. 1999.
79. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 23 and 24 March 2000, at para 5. 
See also Commission, i2010 – A European Information Society for Growth and Employment, 
COM(2005)229 final, 1 June 2005.
80. Commission, Fourth Report on the Application of Directive 89/552/EEC “Television 
without Frontiers”, COM(2002)778 final, 6 Jan. 2003.
81. In the period up to the adoption of the new Directive, legal certainty in the changing 
environment of European media has been guaranteed through an interpretative Communication 
on television advertising, in particular new advertising techniques (split screen, virtual and in-
teractive advertising) and update of the Recommendation on the protection of minors and human 
dignity. See Commission, Commission Interpretative Communication on Certain Aspects of the 
Provisions on Televised Advertising in the “Television without Frontiers” Directive, O.J. 2004, C 
102/2 and Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
minors and human dignity and the right of reply in relation to the competitiveness of the Euro-
pean Audiovisual and Information Services Industry, O.J. 2006, L 38/72.
82. There were particularly intensive discussions, which involved manifold stakeholders. All 
stakeholders’ opinions from the diverse hearings are available at <ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/
tvwf/modernisation/index_en.htm>. 
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(v) protection of minors and human dignity, right of reply; and (vi) rights to 
information and short reporting.83
Procedurally, the adoption of the AVMS was subject to the co-decision for-
mula set out in Article 251 EC, which involves the Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament (EP). Key documents in this process are the 
original proposal of the Commission of 13 December 2005;84 the compro-
mise text tabled by the Finnish Presidency,85 the Report of the Committee on 
Culture and Education,86 and the text adopted by the EP87 amending in first 
reading the Commission’s proposal. On 24 May 2007, after some subsequent 
changes brought in by the Commission,88 a political compromise on the text 
of the AVMS was reached.89 In our analysis, we refer to the latter.
4. Main tenets of the AVMS reform
Of the various changes that the AVMS brings about, we focus our attention on 
three of the novel (and most contentious) solutions, which are likely to have 
substantial effect upon the media ecosystem in Europe and on the diversity 
of cultural expressions therein. These key issues are (i) scope of the AVMS; 
(ii) rules on advertising; and (iii) product placement.
83. See Commission, Fourth Report, supra note 80, at Annex, pp. 33–37. See also the six 
Issue Papers of July 2005, available at <ec.europa.eu/comm/avpolicy/docs/reg/modernisation/
liverpool_2005/uk-conference-report-en.pdf >
84. See supra note 19.
85. The Council addressed in particular four major issues, namely the Directive’s scope, ju-
risdiction, product placement and quantitative advertising rules. Following a long discussion, 
a compromise text was agreed that was supported by all delegations except Sweden, Ireland, 
Latvia, Belgium, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Austria.
86. Report of the Committee on Culture and Education, Rapporteur: Ruth Hieronymi, A6-
0399/2006, 22 Nov. 2006.
87. European Parliament, Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC, P6_TA-
PROV(2006)0559, 13 Dec. 2006.
88. Commission, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC (“Audiovisual Media Services without Fron-
tiers”), COM(2007)170 final, 29 March 2007.
89. Commission, “Commission welcomes political agreement on new Directive for Europe’s 
audiovisual media”, IP/07/706, Brussels, 24 May 2007. See also Council Report on the Amend-
ed Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council 
Directive 89/552/EEC, 2005/0260 (COD), 10 May 2007 and the Addendum to it containing the 
text agreed upon.
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4.1. Extended scope of the AVMS
The first and most groundbreaking element of the reform involves a readjust-
ment of the scope of the Directive. The Commission’s crucial argument in this 
respect was that, given the impact that audiovisual media services have on the 
economy and society, the AVMS rules should apply to all content services, ir-
respective of the technology that delivers them. This is in stark contrast to the 
previous situation, where the different delivery modes received different reg-
ulatory treatment and caused regulatory asymmetries. To remedy this situa-
tion, a broader, generic definition of audiovisual media service was proposed, 
which also implies a larger scope for application of the AVMS. Pursuant to 
Article 190 thereof, an audiovisual media service is identified through six es-
sential elements, which must be simultaneously present. These elements are:
 (i) a service within the meaning of the Treaty provisions (Arts. 49 and 50 
EC);
 (ii) provided under editorial responsibility of a media service provider;91
 (iii) the principal purpose of which is the provision of programmes con-
sisting of moving images with or without sound;92
90. “‘Audiovisual media service’ means a service as defined by Articles 49 and 50 of the 
Treaty which is under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider and the principal 
purpose of which is the provision of programmes in order to inform, entertain or educate the 
general public by electronic communications networks within the meaning of Article 2(a) of 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Such audiovisual media 
services are either television broadcasts as defined in paragraph (c) of this Article or on-demand 
services as defined in paragraph (e) of this Article and/or audiovisual commercial communica-
tion”. Pursuant to some examples given by the Commission, the following qualify as audiovisual 
media services: films, telefilms, serials on demand; sports events on demand; entertainment 
shows on demand; video reports of concerts and live arts performances on demand; TV news 
reports on demand; and advertising delivered in connection with these on-demand services. In 
contrast, advertising not delivered in connection with the on-demand services; video clips in-
serted in websites when the main purpose is not the delivery of audiovisual content but to deliver 
information on the activities of the site owner; animated images inserted on press websites and 
blogs for non-commercial purposes, are not covered by the definition of audiovisual media serv-
ice. See Commission proposal for a modernisation of the Television without Frontiers Directive, 
MEMO/05/475, Brussels, 13 Dec. 2005.
91. Media service provider is defined in Art. 1(b) AVMS as “the natural or legal person who 
has editorial responsibility for the choice of the audiovisual content of the audiovisual media 
service and determines the manner in which it is organised”.
92. The concepts of “programmes” and “editorial responsibility” were introduced by the EP 
in pursuit of a clearer delineation from other audiovisual services. Programme is defined as “a 
set of moving images with or without sound constituting an individual item within a schedule or 
a catalogue established by a media service provider and whose form and content is comparable 
to the form and content of television broadcasting. Examples of programmes include feature-
length films, sports events, situation comedy, documentary, children’s programmes and original 
drama” (Art. 1(aa) AVMS). Editorial responsibility is “the exercise of effective control both over 
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 (iv) in order to inform, entertain or educate;
 (v) to the general public;
 (vi) by electronic communications networks.93
Pursuant to this definition, it is apparent that any content service of commer-
cial nature94 will be caught by the AVMS.
4.1.1. Linear and non-linear audiovisual media services
Under the all-encompassing category of audiovisual media services, two sub-
categories are defined, which, as we shall see below, are treated differently 
under the AVMS regime. The first sub-category is that of television broadcast 
or linear service. It covers audiovisual media services “provided by a media 
service provider for simultaneous viewing of programmes on the basis of a 
programme schedule”.95 The second sub-category comprises on-demand or 
non-linear services, which are offers of audiovisual content “for the viewing 
of programmes at the moment chosen by the user and at his/her individual 
request on the basis of a catalogue of programmes selected by the media ser-
vice provider”.96 On the basis of these definitions, one can say that the rule-
of-thumb for delimitating the categories of linear/non-linear services is the 
possibility of choice and control the user can exercise and also the impact 
they have on society (being “pushed” to everyone or “pulled” individually).97
the selection of the programmes and over their organisation either in a chronological schedule, in 
the case of television broadcasts, or in a catalogue, in the case of on-demand services. Editorial 
responsibility does not necessarily imply any legal liability under national law for the content or 
the services provided” (Art. 1(ab) AVMS).
93. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Servic-
es (Framework Directive), O.J. L 108/33, 24 April 2002. Art. 2(a) thereof defines electronic 
communications networks as “transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or rout-
ing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, 
by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and 
packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, 
to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio 
and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of informa-
tion conveyed”.
94. In Recital 13 AVMS, it was stressed that the economic element must be significant to 
justify the application of the Directive. Accordingly, the scope “does not cover activities which 
are primarily non-economic and which are not in competition with television broadcasting, such 
as private websites and services consisting of the provision or distribution of audiovisual content 
generated by private users for the purposes of sharing and exchange within communities of inter-
est”. See also Recitals 14–16 AVMS.
95. Art. 1(c) AVMS.
96. Art. 1(e) AVMS.
97. Recital 28 AVMS. See also Case C-89/04, Mediakabel BV v. Commissariaat voor de 
Media, [2005] ECR I-4891.
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Taken together, the broader definition of audiovisual media service and the 
delineation of the two categories have three important effects:
(i) first, the overarching idea of platform-neutral content regulation is 
properly reflected and the transport technology does not lead to the exclusion 
of any content services from the reach of the AVMS; 
(ii) second and most importantly, the “country of origin” principle, as the 
core to the Community audiovisual media regime, is extended to all content 
services, including non-linear services. This minimum level of harmoniza-
tion guarantees a functioning single market and prevents the emergence of an 
uneven playing field laden with diverging national rules: Indeed, while it is 
often said that non-linear services were previously unregulated, 19 out of the 
25 Member States do already have some form of regulation.98 The rules at the 
EC level can allegedly also contribute to legal certainty, which will support 
the convergence of linear and non-linear on the supply side and create a ben-
eficial environment of consumer trust and product awareness;99
(iii) third, some flexibility is preserved, which allows for a less stringent 
approach to new media services. The regulation of conventional television 
broadcast (or linear media services) remains almost unchanged (with some 
relaxation of the rules on advertising and product placement, as discussed 
in section 4.2 below). In contrast, non-linear services are subject to a much 
lighter regime and would have to satisfy only a basic tier of rules. These rules 
cover the protection of minors and human dignity; right of reply; identifica-
tion of commercial communications; and minimum qualitative obligations 
regarding commercial communications.
The overall effect aspired to by the above-outlined reform was, in the 
words of the Commission, to increase choice, diversity and investment in 
the European audiovisual media leading to a “vibrant ‘audiovisual content 
without frontiers’ industry that is strongly rooted in the EU”.100 Yet, this as-
piration may remain unfulfilled. In practical terms, the effects of the changes 
made cannot be unequivocally framed as positive. While the TVWF affected 
only licensed broadcasters, the AVMS now covers a much broader range of 
stakeholders, who formerly were, if not unregulated, at least less regulated101 
(by generic rules such as the e-Commerce Directive102). Although the pro-
98. All of the Member States had some requirements on advertising, protection of minors 
and human dignity. None had rules regarding European or independent productions and only 
one Member State had some regulation of advertising limits. See Horlings et al., supra note 1, 
at pp. 16–17.
99. Horlings et al., ibid., at p. 75.
100. Commission, supra note 90.
101. Marsden et al., supra note 1, at p. vi.
102. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
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viders of non-linear services will only have to comply with the laws of their 
own Member State, the regulatory burden upon them is substantial and may 
be detrimental.103 Innovation and entry of new market players may indeed 
be seriously hampered.104 User-generated content as an emerging feature of 
broadband use and the related business models, such as Google and YouTube, 
which support the insertion of advertising into the more popular pieces of 
content will now be affected: the content producer, who chooses to accept ad-
vertising, will be subject to the AVMS as a non-linear provider, even though 
the advertising itself is chosen by the site host.105 This may be prohibitive 
for furthering the positive effects of user-generated and distributed content,106 
which is often central to consumers’ Internet experience,107 and may suppress 
this new type of creativity.
New linear operators (e.g. new channel providers) will also face relatively 
heavy regulatory burdens (in contrast to the incumbent linear operators for 
whom the nominal burden is small). In seeking a reduction in sunk costs 
and realization of positive network effects, content providers will have the 
stimulus to consolidate, which will reinforce concentration in broadcasting 
markets108 and thus have a negative impact on the diversity of cultural expres-
sions in the European media environment.
4.1.2. “Cultural” quotas for non-linear services?
An immediate concern in the context of this new, broader definition of au-
diovisual media services and cultural diversity is whether the existing quota 
mechanisms for European works (Art. 4 TVWF) and for independent produc-
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in 
the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), O.J. 2000, L 178/1.
103. This was a major contentious issue during the AVMS adoption. See e.g. McDowall, 
“The Television without Frontiers Directive: Another ‘Directive Too Far’”, IT Analysis, 5 May 
2006, available at <www.it-analysis.com/business/content.php?cid=8476> and The Economist, 
“Regulation without Frontiers”, 12 Oct. 2006.
104. Marsden et al., supra note 1, passim.
105. Marsden et al., ibid., at p. 25.
106. A recent report of the OECD acknowledges the enormous potential that user created 
content has. It states that, “[t]he Internet as a new creative outlet has altered the economics of 
information production and led to the democratisation of media production and changes in the 
nature of communication and social relationships (sometimes referred to as the ‘rise – or return 
– of the amateurs’). Changes in the way users produce, distribute, access and re-use information, 
knowledge and entertainment potentially gives rise to increased user autonomy, increased par-
ticipation and increased diversity. These may result in lower entry barriers, distribution costs and 
user costs and greater diversity of works as digital shelf space is almost limitless”. See OECD, 
Participative Web, supra note 14, at p. 5.
107. See Benkler, supra note 15.
108. Marsden et al., supra note 1, at p. 130.
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tions (Art. 5 TVWF) are preserved under the AVMS regime. In the frame-
work of TVWF, Article 4(1) prescribed that Member States ensure “where 
practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European 
works a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time 
appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and 
teleshopping”.109 This proportion was to be achieved progressively, on the 
basis of suitable criteria.110 Article 5(1) TVWF provided further that, where 
practicable and by appropriate means, broadcasters reserve at least 10 percent 
of their transmission time, or alternatively, 10 percent of their programming 
budget, for European works created by producers who are independent of 
broadcasters.
Articles 4 and 5 TVWF were the only tools at Community level that were 
per se meant to serve cultural goals, ensuring a balance of offerings in the 
EC broadcasting markets. Regardless of the implementation option chosen 
by the individual Member States,111 the impact study prepared for the TVWF 
review112 showed that the measures to promote European and independent 
productions have indeed had considerable impact. The average ratio of Eu-
ropean works in the qualifying transmission time of the channels rose from 
52.1 percent in 1993 to 57.4 percent in 2002. The average proportion of in-
dependent productions increased from 16.2 percent in 1993 to 20.2 percent 
in 2002 and the share of recent independent productions from 11.3 percent to 
15.7 percent.113 The impact study suggested further that, taking into account 
109. Emphasis added. “European works” were defined pursuant to criteria set out by Art. 6 
TVWF.
110. Art. 4(1) TVWF.
111. For an overview of the national legislation put in place in the diverse Member States, 
see Graham & Associates, Impact Study of Measures (Community and National) Concerning 
the Promotion of Distribution and Production of TV Programmes Provided for under Art. 25(a) 
of the TV Without Frontiers Directive, Final Report Prepared for The Audiovisual, Media and 
Internet Unit of DG Information Society, 24 May 2005, at Chapt. 6. While the majority of Mem-
ber States has transcribed the definitions directly into national legislation, France and Germany 
apply stricter definitions. France distinguishes between audiovisual works and cinematographic 
works. Germany defines what is included as qualifying hours: feature films, television movies, 
series, documentaries and comparable productions. Six Member States – Finland, France, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Spain and the UK – apply higher percentage requirements than those contained 
in TVWF on some or all of their broadcasters. For example, in France, legislation requires all 
broadcasters to reserve at least 60% of their qualifying hours for European audiovisual and cin-
ematographic works (ibid).
112. Graham & Associates, op. cit. supra note 111. See also Commission, Seventh Com-
munication on the Application of Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 89/552/EEC “Television without 
Frontiers”, as Amended by Directive 97/36/EC for the Period 2003–2004, COM(2006)459 final, 
14 Aug. 2006.
113. Graham & Associates, ibid., at p. 14 and Chapter 7. The more prescriptive a Member 
State is in the way that it implements Arts. 4 and 5 TVWF, the higher the average ratio of Eu-
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these developments, there is no need to change114 either the majority share 
for European works or the minimum share for independent productions: Ar-
ticles 4 and 5 TVWF were deemed to already be achieving their cultural aims 
“inasmuch as … [they] have increased the proportion of European works and 
independent productions broadcast by channels in the EU”.115
The EU Commissioner for Information Society and Media, Viviane Red-
ing was delighted by the high share of airtime devoted to European works 
and stated that, “[t]his is proof of the high quality of Europe’s home-grown 
audiovisual content and of the vitality of an audiovisual industry that draws 
upon Europe’s rich cultural diversity”.116
We argue to the contrary that the higher share of European productions 
is by no means a sign of increased (or existing) diversity of cultural expres-
sions. The definition of what qualifies as “European work” is neither based 
upon originality and quality criteria nor does it require a particular expression 
of national and European themes.117 It is based merely on the construct that a 
majority of its authors and workers reside in one or more Member States and 
comply with one of the three conditions: (a) the work is made by one or more 
producers established in a Member State or States party to the CTT; (b) the 
production is supervised and controlled by producer(s) established in one or 
more of those States; or (c) the contribution of co-producers of those States 
to the total co-production costs is preponderant and the co-production is not 
controlled by producer(s) established outside those States.118
Indeed, in this shape and form, the cultural diversity rationale for the pro-
motion of European works is barely distinguishable from a protectionist one, 
aiming to secure a certain amount of airtime for works produced with Euro-
pean money.119 It is noteworthy that the impact study could not prove that, in 
ropean works to qualifying transmission hours in that country. Member States with a national 
average for European works greater than the EU average – such as Finland, France, Greece, Italy 
and Luxembourg – are also among the most prescriptive in the way they apply Arts. 4 and 5 (ibid. 
at section 8.1).
114. The impact study noted however that the “where practicable” mode, which offers an 
exemption from the requirements of Arts. 4 and 5 TVWF, compares unfavourably with other 
legislation (despite the existing reporting obligation), where general rules are established and the 
exemptions clearly defined, leaving less room for avoidance. It was further considered that the 
use of this exemption may need to be reviewed as secondary channels take a greater share and 
often become part of larger multi-channel conglomerates. Ibid at p. 181 and section 8.2.5.
115. Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at p. 181 (emphasis added) and section 4.6.3.
116. Commission, “European works’ share of TV broadcasting time now stable over 60%”, 
IP/06/1115, Brussels, 22 Aug. 2006.
117. Graber, supra note 61, at pp. 253–254.
118. Art. 6(2) in conjunction with 6(1)(a) and (b) TVWF.
119. Such a rationale is apparent from Recital 20 TVWF (“Whereas it is therefore necessary 
to promote markets of sufficient size for television productions in the Member States to recover 
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the absence of Articles 4 and 5 TVWF, the trade deficit with the US120 would 
have been larger and that the measures to promote the circulation of pro-
grammes within the EU have also promoted exports.121 We deem that such a 
definition of European works and the related policy measures does little to 
prevent the increasing homogenization of content and deteriorating quality of 
programmes.122 A “Big Brother” type of show financed with European money 
qualifies perfectly as both a European work and an independent production.
The question of whether the quota mechanisms will be translated into the 
domain of non-linear audiovisual services was key in the discussions of the 
AVMS. They exposed yet again the existing divergences between the Com-
munity institutions and between the Community and the Member State lev-
els, as well as the profound conflict inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of 
economic and cultural goals.123 The majority agreed that the quota system, 
as contained in the TVWF, will be preserved under the AVMS but will apply 
only to linear (television broadcasting) services. With regard to non-linear 
services, there was a strong conviction that a quota rule would be burden-
some and in any case, difficult to install and track. The AVMS does how-
ever include a soft-law provision, which creates an obligation for the Member 
States to ensure that media service providers under their jurisdiction “pro-
mote, where practicable and by appropriate means, production of and access 
to European works”.124 It is further clarified that, such promotion could relate, 
inter alia, to the financial contribution to the production and rights acquisi-
tion of European works or to the share and/or prominence of European works 
necessary investments not only by establishing common rules opening up national markets but 
also by envisaging for European productions where practicable and by appropriate means a ma-
jority proportion in television programmes of all Member States”). See e.g. Donaldson, “’Televi-
sion without Frontiers’: The continuing tension between liberal free trade and European cultural 
integrity” (1996) Fordham International Law Journal, 90–180.
120. Although it was found that, “there is a greater appetite for US programming among 
European audiences than for programmes produced in other Member States … [because] US 
programme storylines have broad appeal, whereas European production has a national cultural 
appeal which does not travel well”. See Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at p. 18 and 
section 9.3.3. For an interesting comment on the global power of American popular culture 
(influencing through attraction rather than coercion), see Rosendorf, “Social and cultural glo-
balization: Concepts, history, and America’s role” in Nye and Donahue (Eds.), Governance in a 
Globalizing World (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 109–134, at pp. 117 et seq.
121. Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at section 8.5.
122. See supra section 2. There is evidence that primary channels have reduced the propor-
tion of European works that are stock programmes (generally more expensive) and increased the 
proportion of (generally cheaper) flow programmes. See Graham & Associates, supra note 111, 
at section 7.3.4.
123. These conflicts are not new and arose every time the TVWF was discussed. See Drijber, 
supra note 34, at 90.
124. Art. 3(h)(1) AVMS (emphasis added).
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in the catalogue of programmes.125 Member States are to report every four 
years on the implementation of this provision.126 Upon the basis of these data 
and an independent study, the Commission is then obliged to report to the 
Parliament and the Council, taking into consideration the market, technologi-
cal developments and the objective of cultural diversity.127
Interestingly, the AVMS does mention that, at least technically, a quota 
mechanism is possible despite the entirely different characteristics of non-lin-
ear audiovisual services: the quotas may be based upon the products on offer 
(instead of on broadcasts as with linear services) and take for instance the 
form of a minimum share of European works in on-demand catalogues.128
The question is therefore not so much whether imposing quotas is still do-
able. It is more fundamental: has the increase in consumer choice and multi-
channel capacity rendered the rules on broadcasting quotas obsolete? And 
related to this: is there a need for a new legal model ensuring the diversity of 
cultural expressions in the new audiovisual media settings?
Before looking into these questions, one needs to acknowledge a few 
things that are pertinent in this context. Firstly, that the linear and non-linear 
market segments do compete, at least indirectly.129 In the long term, non-lin-
ear audiovisual media services have the potential to partially replace linear 
services, a fact also admitted by the EC legislature.130 Secondly, the effects of 
a quota mechanism for non-linear services are quite unpredictable and may 
even have diametrically opposed outcomes. A first option is that consum-
ers (being empowered by technology) would simply not choose European 
works and thus render any investment/catalogue quota ineffective. Another, 
rather different option is an application of the so-called “Long Tail” theory.131 
125. Art. 3(h)(1) AVMS.
126. Art. 3(h)(3) AVMS. Recital 35 AVMS clarifies that within the framework of these re-
ports, Member States should take into account the financial contribution by such services to the 
production and rights acquisition of European works; the share of European works in the cata-
logue of audiovisual media services, as well as in the effective users’ consumption of European 
works proposed by such services.
127. Art. 3(h)(4) AVMS.
128. Art. 3(h)(1) and Recital 35 AVMS. A previous version of the latter provision also in-
cluded the option of a minimum share of European works proportionate to economic perform-
ance. See also Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 52.
129. Horlings et al., ibid., at p. 47.
130. Recital 35 AVMS.
131. In its briefest form, the Long Tail theory, pursuant to its author − the editor-in-chief of 
the Wired magazine − holds that in digital markets: (i) supply and demand are not concentrated 
only on a small definite number of products (as in the offline world) and the tail of available va-
riety is almost endless; (ii) the entire tail is within reach economically; and (iii) all those niches, 
when aggregated make up a significant market. These developments are above all due to the 
significantly reduced in the digital environment storage and distribution costs, as well as the 
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This means that in the new environment of indefinitely diverse media, the 
consumer selection will constantly generate new and/or niche products (simi-
larly to the Amazon bookselling platform132). Consumers will be stimulated 
to consume products that would otherwise not be available to them (because 
of the scarcity of timeslots in TV schedules) and will thus induce markets to 
offer new types of content, including, for instance, archived European con-
tent, original works, documentaries or director’s cuts.133 This may ultimately 
lead to a higher share of available and effectively consumed European works, 
which, if realized, will be a genuine expression of cultural diversity.
As a tentative conclusion based upon the above and as an answer to the 
questions raised, we suggest that the European legislature took a rather un-
imaginative approach in addressing cultural policy objectives at the Commu-
nity level in the face of new technological developments, changed business 
and consumer behaviour patterns. Preserving the status quo quota system 
for linear services and creating soft-law stimulus for non-linear services is 
by no means an adequate answer to the dynamic and complex environment 
of audiovisual media and the redefined need to safeguard some diversity in 
it. Quota mechanisms based upon the existing definition of European works 
are in any case of dubious cultural value. The parties involved in the AVMS 
legislative process seemed unwilling however to take up and pursue the con-
troversial “cultural questions” and reignite the latent conflicts between inte-
grationists and intergovernmentalists, interventionists and liberalizers, when 
other, notably economic, interests were at stake.
4.2. Audiovisual commercial communications
The second major reform brought by the AVMS is in the area of advertising, 
or what is now referred to as “audiovisual commercial communications”. 
This is indeed a most crucial area of media regulation, since advertising is 
new methods of searching and finding products and services online. See Anderson, The Long 
Tail: Why the Future of Business is selling less of more (New York, Hyperion, 2006). See also 
Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, “From niches to riches: The anatomy of the long tail”, (2006) Sloan 
Management Review, 67–71; Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester, “Goodbye Pareto principle, hello 
long tail: The effect of search costs on the concentration of product sales”, February 2007, avail-
able at <ssrn.com/abstract=953587>.
132. Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, “Consumer surplus in the digital economy: Estimating 
the value of increased product variety at online booksellers”, (2003) MIT Sloan Working Paper 
No 4305–03, available at <ssrn.com/abstract=400940>.
133. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 66; Marsden et al., supra note 1, at pp. 22–23. See in 
this respect, European Charter for the Development and the Take-up of Film Online, initiated in 
May 2005 by Commissioner Reding and endorsed by film makers and business leaders on 23 
May 2006, at the Europe Day of the 59th Cannes Film Festival (available at <ec.europa.eu/comm/
avpolicy/docs/ other_actions/film_online_en.pdf>).
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the main source of revenue for European television broadcasters and likely 
to remain so.134 The gross television advertising market has been consistently 
expanding and reached ¤ 25.7 billion for the EU15 in 2004, which is a 7.2 
percent increase in relation to 2003.135 As far as new media are concerned, In-
ternet advertising and computer games revenues are the fastest growing share 
of media spending and expected to continue growing considerably.136
Similarly to the “audiovisual media service” definition, the concept of “au-
diovisual commercial communication” is a broad one. It is a notion taken 
from the e-Commerce Directive with an almost identical content137 and is 
meant to encapsulate all rules related to advertising. It is defined as “images 
with or without sound which are designed to promote, directly or indirectly, 
the goods, services or image of a natural or legal entity pursuing an economic 
activity. Such images accompany or are included in a programme in return 
for payment or for similar consideration or for self-promotional purposes. 
Forms of audiovisual commercial communication include, inter alia, televi-
sion advertising, sponsorship, teleshopping and product placement”.138
In the so-defined domain of audiovisual commercial communications, the 
first objective of the reform undertaken was to secure a basic tier of rules at 
the Community level, which would provide legal certainty across all Member 
States. Thus, pursuant to the AVMS, all audiovisual commercial communica-
tions must not: (i) use subliminal techniques;139 (ii) prejudice respect for hu-
man dignity; (iii) include or promote any discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orien-
tation; (iv) encourage behaviour prejudicial to health or to safety; or (v) en-
courage behaviour grossly prejudicial to the protection of the environment.140 
Further, all forms of commercial communications regarding cigarettes and 
other tobacco products, medicinal products and medical treatment available 
only on prescription are prohibited.141
134. Commission, Fifth Report, supra note 51, at p. 4.
135. Ibid., referring to the European Audiovisual Observatory, 2005 Yearbook. See also Gra-
ham & Associates, supra note 111, at section 3.2.1.
136. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 9, referring to Zenith Optimedia, “Advertising Ex-
penditure Forecasts”, July 2005, available at <www.zenithoptimedia.com>
137. Directive 2000/31/EC (see supra note 102) defines in its Art. 2(f), “commercial com-
munication” as “any form of communication by electronic means designed to promote, directly 
or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a company, organisation or person pursuing a com-
mercial, industrial or craft activity or exercising a regulated profession”.
138. Art. 1(f) AVMS.
139. Art. 3(d)(1)(b) AVMS. 
140. Art. 3(d)(1), point (c) AVMS.
141. Art. 3(d)(1), points (d) and (ea) AVMS.
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The second objective of the TVWF review in the field of audiovisual com-
mercial communications was to deregulate them and adopt a lighter, flexible 
approach allowing more possibilities for broadcasters and content providers 
to increase the value of advertising time, which would also properly reflect 
the more multi-faceted media environment.142 According to the principles of 
flexibility and simplicity pursued, the EC legislature introduced two blocks of 
changes:
(i) first, a relaxation of the rules on the insertion of advertising in TV pro-
grammes and daily advertising limits; and 
(ii) second, new regulation of product placement.
We shall look into these below and contemplate their justifications and po-
tential effects on cultural diversity.
4.2.1. Rules on advertising
The AVMS removes some of the existing quantitative limits on advertising. 
The current three-hours-per-day limit on advertising is dropped, since practi-
cal experience has shown that in fact no TV channel comes close to it. The 
12-minute upper limit on all advertising in any given hour however is main-
tained.143 As to the insertion of advertising, the Commission was eager to 
grant broadcasters more freedom to choose the most suitable moment for 
advertisements within the programmes. The EP however was adamant in this 
regard and insisted upon the principle that advertising and teleshopping spots 
can be inserted only between programmes. In the final AVMS, an explicit 
formulation of this rule is avoided and Article 11(1) states only that Member 
States must ensure, “where advertising or teleshopping is inserted during 
programmes, that the integrity of the programmes, taking into account natural 
breaks in and the duration and the nature of the programme” is not preju-
diced.144
The frequency of advertising breaks was a hot topic in the discussions of 
the AVMS. In its initial proposal the Commission foresaw a minimum of 35 
minutes between the advertisements inserted in films made for television 
(excluding series, serials, light entertainment programmes and documenta-
142. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 79.
143. Art. 18 AVMS states that, “[t]he proportion of advertising spots and teleshopping spots 
within a given clock hour shall not exceed 20%”. See also Recital 44 and the Commission Inter-
pretative Communication, supra note 81, at paras. 9–13.
144. Emphasis added. One could view Recital 43 AVMS as a sort of leftover of the EP’s 
demands. The latter states that, “[t]he Directive is intended to safeguard the specific charac-
ter of the European television landscape, where advertising is preferably inserted between pro-
grammes, and therefore limits possible interruptions for cinematographic works and films made 
for television as well as for some categories of programmes that still need specific protection”.
Audiovisual media 1713
ries), cinematographic works, children’s and news programmes. The proposal 
of the EP Committee on Culture and Education reversed this to the TVWF 
benchmark of 45 minutes and included concerts, theatre plays and operas in 
the provision. Interestingly, the text adopted by the Parliament at first reading 
ignores the proposal of its own committee and even goes below the minimum 
suggested by the Commission. The rule is now that the transmission of films 
made for television (excluding series, serials and documentaries), cinemato-
graphic works and news programmes may be interrupted by advertising and/
or teleshopping once for each scheduled period of at least 30 minutes.145
Thus, while the EP has normally put brakes on the Commission’s spur to 
liberalize advertising in audiovisual media, it is apparent here that the will-
ingness to allow more freedom to broadcasters has prevailed. This will un-
doubtedly give better opportunities for broadcasters and content providers to 
monetize but will also speed up the already advanced commercialization of 
television.146 Trying to show the programmes of greatest appeal in the most 
valuable timeslots in order to attract advertising naturally leads to margin-
alization of specific, original programmes and those that otherwise diverge 
from the mainstream.
4.2.2. Rules on product placement
The second important change in the domain of audiovisual commercial com-
munications is the newly formulated attitude towards product placement.147 
Product placement is defined as “any form of audiovisual commercial com-
munication consisting of the inclusion of or reference to a product, a service 
or the trade mark thereof so that it is featured within a programme, in return 
for payment or for similar consideration”.148 
145. Art. 11(2) AVMS. The provision clarifies further that the transmission of children’s 
programmes may be interrupted by advertising and/or teleshopping once for each scheduled 
period of at least 30 minutes, provided the scheduled duration of the programme is greater than 
30 minutes. No advertising or teleshopping may be inserted during religious services.
146. See Graber, Zwischen Geist und Geld; Interferenzen von Kunst und Wirtschaft aus 
rechtlicher Sicht (Nomos, 1994) at pp. 151 et seq.
147. The notion of product placement is not entirely new. The Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive mentions in its provisions “legitimate product placement” and the Commission Com-
munication interpreting the TVWF Directive allows product presentation for the purposes of 
identifying the sponsor. See Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the In-
ternal Market and Amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
of the European Parliament and of the Council (“Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”), O.J. 
2005, L 149/22, at Recital 6.
148. Art. 1(k) AVMS.
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In the original proposal of the Commission, product placement was fully 
“legitimized” and taken as an essential element of advertising techniques. The 
opposition was however too strong. The compromise reached is to preserve 
the ban on product placement but it is no longer an outright ban.149 Product 
placement in cinematographic works, films and series made for audiovisual 
media services, sports programmes and light entertainment programmes is 
permitted.150 Such programmes must respect certain conditions: they should 
never affect or jeopardize the editorial responsibility and independence of 
the media service provider, nor should they “directly encourage the purchase 
or rental of goods or services” or give “undue prominence to the product in 
question”.151 Following the general rule of separate and clearly identifiable 
commercial communications,152 viewers are to be appropriately informed of 
the existence of product placement at the start and at the end of the pro-
gramme, and when a programme resumes after an advertising break.153 In any 
event, product placement for tobacco products, cigarettes or medicinal prod-
ucts or medical treatments available on prescription only is not allowed.154
We need to note here that, while the EP limited the scope of the legitimiza-
tion of product placement, what is allowed is not negligible: indeed, the major 
audiovisual formats of cinematographic works, films and series made for 
television and sports broadcasts do allow product placement. 
The Commission argues that by providing a clear framework for product 
placement new revenues for the European audiovisual industry would be se-
cured. This would increase its competitiveness, especially vis-à-vis the US 
media industry,155 where product placement accounts for 1.7 percent of the 
total advertising revenues of free-to-air broadcasters and grew by an average 
of 21 percent per year between 1999 and 2004.156 More oddly, the Commis-
sion also believes that the new rules on product placement will “help to boost 
149. Surreptitious advertising remains fully banned. See Arts. 1(h) and 3(d)(1)(a) AVMS. 
See also Recitals 40 and 45 AVMS.
150. As well as in cases where no payment is made but certain goods or services are merely 
provided free of charge. See Art. 3(f)(2) AVMS.
151. Art. 3(f)(2), points (a)-(ba).
152. Art. 3(d)(1)(a) AVMS. See also Art. 10(1) AVMS.
153. Art. 3(f)(2)(c) AVMS. As an exception, however, Member States may choose to waive 
these requirements provided that the programme in question has neither been produced nor com-
missioned by the media service provider itself or a company affiliated to the media service 
provider (Art. 3(f)(2), last paragraph). 
154. Art. 3(f)(3) AVMS.
155. The EU has a notoriously vast deficit vis-à-vis the US, which amounts to about ¤ 4.1 
billion. See Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at section 3.3.1.
156. See Carat & Koan, Final Report of the Comparative Study on the Impact of Control 
Measures on the Televisual Advertising Markets in European Union Member States and Certain 
Other Countries, prepared for the Commission, July 2005, at pp. 60–61.
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our creative economy and thus reinforce cultural diversity”.157 Indeed, both 
the rules on advertising and the rules on product placement are seen as “fur-
ther instruments safeguarding cultural diversity”.158
While the less restrictive Community regime on product placement may be 
somewhat justified in view of its value as a financial source for content pro-
viders and in order to prevent the emergence of multiple national rules dis-
torting the single market, it is difficult for us to see how product placement 
contributes to cultural diversity. The nature of product placement is such that 
it is an integral part of the fictional work or sports event.159 Due to this essen-
tial characteristic, the viewer cannot simply skip the advertisement or switch 
channels until the commercial break is over. Furthermore, being often part of 
the storyline of fictional works and thus part of the “reality” they represent, 
its attractant effect may be much stronger than that of conventional advertis-
ing in commercial breaks. The commercial intention of product placement is 
indeed partly concealed and therefore less obtrusive or even not realized at 
all by the recipients who cannot avoid this type of integrated advertising eas-
ily.160 With the advances in technology enabling consumers to “pull” content 
individually, the incentives to include product placement will be increased 
both for the content providers and for the companies whose products/services 
are advertised. This will naturally lead to an increase in the quantity and qual-
ity of product placement (in the sense that its intertwining with the plot will 
be perfected thereby multiplying its effects161). Thus, the commodification of 
artistic productions162 will be strongly intensified and diversity of cultural ex-
pressions smothered rather than stimulated.
157. Commission, supra note 90.
158. Ibid.
159. There are different types of product placement. One can distinguish between product 
placement per se, where branded goods are presented, either visually (if the product is shown) or 
verbally (if it is mentioned or described). Endorsement is an intensification of the verbal place-
ment, when the media representative mentions certain positive features of the product. One may 
also distinguish different degrees of product integration: on-set placement where the product is 
only part of the requisite scenery versus creative placement where the product plays an active 
role in the plot. 
160. Rössler and Bacher, “Transcultural effects of product placement in movies” (2002) 
Zeitschrift für Medienpsychologie, 98–108, at 99.
161. It has been established that stronger placement effects can be expected when the place-
ment is presented as a natural part of the story. See Rössler and Bacher, ibid., at p. 101.
162. For the classic critique of the cultural industries, see Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 
(Routledge, 1984). On the relationship between art and money, see Graber, supra note 146. See 
also Graber and Teubner, “Art and Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere?” (1998) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 61–74.
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5. Conclusion on the impact of the AVMS on cultural diversity
As we already noted, the precise effects of the regulatory changes undertaken 
and the development of the diverse audiovisual media markets are hard to 
predict. “The extreme nature of the predictive challenge is due to the unusual 
volatility of content markets and citizen tastes in media consumption, which 
rely on network effects to a great extent (especially in non-linear demand pat-
terns) as well as having extreme economies of scale because of the perfect re-
producibility of digital content”.163 The concrete implications for the diversity 
of cultural expressions are even harder to predict since cultural diversity itself 
is a dynamic parameter.
Despite the constraints of prediction, some trends in the development of 
European audiovisual media are already discernible. The completely new 
landscape we described at the outset of this article is likely to continue its 
transformation gradually but profoundly.164 The multiplication of channels for 
content distribution is likely to go on. By 2010–2014 (i.e. within the project-
ed lifetime of the AVMS), most Member States will have completed the tran-
sition to digital signal.165 Upon this transition, every household will receive 
between 20 and 40 free TV channels.166 This growth in channel choice will 
reduce the total audience share of the primary channels167 and the share of 
individual primary channels in each Member State. Audience fragmentation 
will put revenue pressure on the primary channels (especially commercial 
ones) and undermine the public funding of leading public primary channels.168 
Furthermore, the new media distribution channels, above all broadband, will 
draw consumers away from traditional entertainment media, further reduc-
ing the audience share of primary channels.169 “Pulling” individual content 
through digital TV or Internet channels is an emergent consumer behaviour 
pattern likely to change the business models of content providers, distributors 
and advertisers and further fragment the media environment. Whichever pat-
tern of access to and use of audiovisual content prevails,170 it is apparent that 
163. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at pp. 4–5.
164. In the mid-term (2009-2010) and even for some time thereafter, no complete overhaul 
of the European audiovisual media is foreseen. See Horlings et al., ibid., at p. 5. The same posi-
tion is shared by the impact study, see Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at section 3.5.4.
165. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 13.
166. Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at section 3.5.1.
167. These are defined as channels with audience share equal to or greater than 3%. See 
Graham & Associates, ibid., at section 7.
168. Ibid., at section 3.5.5.
169. Ibid., at section 3.5.1.
170. RAND Europe outlines three plausible scenarios for the digital future of audiovisual 
media: (i) Linear Continuum: where the citizen behaviour will change at the margins, but me-
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the split between multi-channel and analogue households, which is already a 
reality, will become more pronounced.171 If Internet penetration is to stabilize 
at 65–75 percent by household and mobile phone penetration at 85 percent,172 
this means that a substantial proportion of people will remain offline. This 
minority is “both the most vulnerable in society and least likely to change 
(typically comprising the most elderly, non-formally qualified and/or poorest 
quartiles)”.173
The broader picture of the European media landscape will thus be one of 
increasing fragmentation of audiences and increasing gap between the digi-
tal “haves” and “have-nots”. At the same time, a concentration amongst the 
diverse market players, both horizontally and vertically, is expected, so they 
can make better use of all the existing channels (e.g. by placing a single vid-
eo clip on broadband, mobile and digital TV networks) and benefiting from 
economies of scale. Such an environment makes the design of an appropriate 
regulatory model extremely difficult, in particular where objectives of cater-
ing for public interest are concerned. Our focus was upon only one of these 
objectives, namely the sustainability of the diversity of cultural expressions in 
audiovisual media.
Cultural diversity has always been defined as one of the vital justifications 
for European audiovisual media policy. At its very onset, epitomized by the 
Rhodes Summit of the European Council, the Council stressed that the future 
TVWF initiative should “provide an opportunity of demonstrating the rich-
ness and diversity of European culture”174 and “contribute to a substantial 
strengthening of a European cultural identity…”.175 Later, when formulating 
the principles of the Community’s audiovisual strategy for the digital age, the 
Commission stated that, “[t]he audiovisual industry is … not an industry like 
any other and does not simply produce goods to be sold on the market like 
other goods. It is in fact a cultural industry par excellence. It has a major in-
dia consumption will remain a largely linear experience; (ii) Digital Content Divide: where the 
digital “haves” will experience greatly increased interactive media use, while an equal number 
of “refuseniks” will continue exactly as before to rely on offline media and public service broad-
casters; (iii) Time Shifting Linear Consumption: where the majority of the population will use 
broadband and mobile or in-home devices to time-shift their media to suit their schedule instead 
of that of the broadcaster. See Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 8. The same scenarios have been 
reiterated by the Commission in its Staff Working Document annexed to the AVMS proposal, 
see supra 19.
171. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 8.
172. Horlings et al., ibid., at p. 6, referring to the Oxford Internet Survey (OxIS), February 
2005, available at <www.oii.ox.ac.uk/>.
173. Horlings et al., ibid.
174. European Council Decisions of 2 and 3 Dec. 1988, Rhodes, supra note 29.
175. Ibid.
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fluence on what citizens know, believe and feel and plays a crucial role in the 
transmission, development and even construction of cultural identities”.176
In the AVMS, the Parliament was particularly insistent on the amendment 
of Recital 3, which, pursuant to the EP’s formulation, held that, “[a]udiovisual 
media services are as much cultural goods as they are economic goods. Their 
growing importance for societies, democracy – in particular by ensuring free-
dom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism – education 
and culture justifies the application of specific rules to these services, and 
the enforcement of those rules, notably in order to preserve the fundamental 
rights and freedoms laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Freedoms, and in order to ensure the protection of minors and vul-
nerable and disabled people”.177
Despite these lengthy deliberations and handsome rhetoric, in our exami-
nation of the major provisions of the AVMS, we saw no concrete solutions 
addressing cultural diversity considerations or any of the values innate to 
cultural identity and diversity. The broad definition of audiovisual media ser-
vices would allow for expanding the reach of the EC media framework and 
an extension of the economically beneficial “country of origin” principle. 
On the other hand, the regulation of non-linear services may be onerous for 
smaller market players or individual providers of content, which may in turn 
create a barrier to newly emerging creativity and online content distribution. 
The preservation of the status quo regarding quotas for European works and 
independent productions, which remain applicable to television broadcast but 
not to non-linear services, is a mere political compromise, which disregards 
the new technological developments and the increasing fragmentation of au-
diences. In its present form, we argue that it bears no real relation to cultural 
policy objectives and even if achieved, the quotas do not reflect cultural di-
versity. With respect to advertising and product placement, we held that the 
liberalizing rationales have prevailed and there are no genuine considerations 
of protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions.
176. Commission communication on Principles and Guidelines for the Community’ Audio-
visual Policy in the Digital Age, COM(1999)657 final, 14 Dec. 1999, at p. 8. See also Council 
Resolution of 21 Jan. 2002 on the Role of Culture in the Development of the European Union, 
O.J. 2002, C 32/2, and Council Conclusions of 19 Dec. 2002 on the “Television without Fron-
tiers” Directive, O.J. 2003, C 13/1, at Recital 3.
177. The final AVMS text, while preserving the above text, substantially shortened it. Recital 
3 now reads: “Audiovisual media services are as much cultural services as they are economic 
services. Their growing importance for societies, democracy – in particular by ensuring freedom 
of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism – education and culture justifies the 
application of specific rules to these services”.
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The amazing gap between the rhetoric of the European legislature and the 
reality of the regulatory instruments adopted in the AVMS also reveals no real 
understanding of what cultural diversity in audiovisual media is. Indeed, this 
at times frivolous waving of the banner of cultural diversity may undermine 
the very value of this notion.
Pursuant to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization (UNESCO) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions,178 “cultural diversity” is defined as “the 
manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find expression. 
These expressions are passed on within and among groups and societies. 
Cultural diversity is made manifest not only through the varied ways in which 
the cultural heritage of humanity is expressed, augmented and transmitted 
through the variety of cultural expressions, but also through diverse modes of 
artistic creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment, what-
ever the means and technologies used.”179 This all-encompassing, broad con-
cept of cultural diversity and the inherent complexity of the notion of culture180 
admittedly make it hard to delineate clear-cut contours of cultural diversity in 
audiovisual media. 
It should have been precisely the task of the European legislator to find 
these contours. In the concrete setting of audiovisual media, one could fol-
low the basic lines that, “[d]iverse is such a cultural landscape, where next 
to the big commercial productions, which pursue above all maximization of 
viewers’ numbers, there is the possibility for existence of other productions 
– productions that depart from the ‘mainstream’ through, for instance, the 
original touch of their author, their ‘low budget’ production costs, experimen-
tal or avant-garde nature, or due to other reasons, which stimulate the fantasy 
and thoughts of the public”.181 Looking at the markets for audiovisual media 
178. UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, adopted at the 33rd Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, 20 Oct. 2005, 
entered into force 18 March 2007 (hereinafter UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity). On 
the UNESCO Convention, see Graber, “The new UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: 
A counterbalance to the WTO” (2006) Journal of International Economic Law, 553–574. On 
cultural diversity, see Graber, supra note 61, at pp. 73 et seq.; Smiers, Arts under Pressure (New 
York, Zed Books, 2004) and the collection of contributions in Graber, Girsberger and Nenova, 
supra note 61.
179. Art. 4(1) of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.
180. It was in 1952 when Kroeber and Kluckholn compiled a list of more than 200 different 
definitions of culture (see Kroeber and Kluckholn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and 
Definitions (Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum, 1952)). Since then the concept has only gained 
in complexity and controversies despite the ample literature discussing it.
181. Graber, supra note 61, at p. 74. In the original: “Vielfältig ist eine Kulturlandschaft, in 
der neben kommerziellen Grossproduktionen, bei denen die Maximierung der Zuschauerzahlen 
allem andern vorgeht, auch solche existieren können, die sich z.B. durch die eigenwillige Hand-
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services, the EC legislature may then examine possible objective parameters 
for “measuring” diversity and identify the regulatory options. Moreau and 
Peltier suggest, for instance, three dimensions of diversity: variety, balance 
and disparity182 and by quantifying them, attempt an analysis of national film 
markets,183 allowing thereby for an assessment of the efficiency of the differ-
ent cultural policy measures taken. The EC is undoubtedly free in its choice 
of approaches but not, we argue, free to simply protect European media under 
the disguise of cultural diversity policy.
6. Commitments of the EC to the protection of cultural diversity
An almost perfect justification for the lack of real provisions on the protec-
tion and promotion of cultural diversity in the AVMS is that the Community 
has no explicit regulatory competence on these issues. Indeed, the relatively 
fuzzy definition of the scope of the Community competences in Article 151 
EC184 and, above all, the principle of subsidiarity leave little room for the 
Community action. The Member States are meant to pursue their own cultur-
al policy goals as they see fit and the Community has repeatedly confirmed 
the conformity of measures intended for their achievement with EC law. In 
addition to the derogations to the free movements explicitly formulated in 
Article 30 EC, it was in Cassis de Dijon185 that the Court of Justice developed 
an open-ended list of mandatory requirements (also known as “imperative 
requirements” or “overriding requirements in the public interest”).186 Cultural 
schrift ihrer Autoren vom ‘mainstream’ abheben, mit einem ‘low budget’ produziert wurden, 
experimenteller oder avantgardistischer Machart sind oder aus anderen Gründen einen eigenen 
Aufwand des Publikums an Phantasie oder Gedanken erfordern.” (translation by the author).
182. Variety refers to the number of categories into which a certain quantity can be parti-
tioned (e.g. types of programmes). Balance refers to the pattern in the distribution of that quan-
tity across the relevant categories. As for disparity, it refers to the nature and the degree to which 
the categories themselves are different from each other. The greater the variety, the balance and 
the disparity of a system are, the larger its diversity. See Moreau and Peltier, “Cultural diversity 
in the movie industry: A cross-national study” (2004) Journal of Media Economics, 123–143.
183. Moreau and Peltier examine the EU15, France, Hungary, South Korea and Mexico and 
refer to both supplied and consumed diversity. Ibid.
184. For a critique, see e.g. Craufurd Smith, “Article 151 EC and European Identity” in 
Craufurd Smith, op. cit. supra note 23, pp. 277–297.
185. Case 120/78, Rewe Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), [1979] ECR 649. 
186. See e.g. Scott, “Mandatory or imperative requirements in the EU and the WTO” in 
Barnard and Scott (Eds.), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises 
(Oxford: Hart, 2002) and Spaventa, “On discrimination and the theory of mandatory require-
ments”, (2000) CYELS, 457–478. These mandatory requirements are still available as justifica-
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policy measures implemented in the audiovisual sector fall within this cat-
egory and “constitute an overriding requirement relating to the general inter-
est which justifies a restriction on the freedom to provide services”.187 Thus, 
the creation of the single market, while certainly being the more dominant 
goal of the Community policies, does allow the parallel existence of other 
objectives, including within the domain of culture.188 It is important to note 
however that the EC Courts have been protecting these public interest goals 
only “negatively”, in the sense of an exception from the freedom to provide 
services, rather than in the “positive” manner of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights when interpreting and applying the freedom of speech provision 
of Article 10 ECHR.189
The new audiovisual media environment, elements of which we described 
above, calls however for a positive and comprehensive approach at the Com-
munity level. A puzzle of fragmented measures at the Member State level 
would not work properly in an ecosystem of increasingly fragmented audi-
ences, multiple channels and new technologies enabling consumers’ choice 
and control. Subsidized programming and national rules of origin will tend 
to affect a continually diminishing slice of the average household’s content 
alternatives.190 Furthermore, the measures taken at the national level often 
appear to be pursuing more protectionist than cultural goals, thereby leading 
to both distortion of the market mechanisms and devaluation of the cultural 
objectives.191
tion only of indistinctly applicable measures (Case 113/80, Commission v. Ireland (Irish Sou-
venirs), [1981] ECR 1626, para 11; Case 177/83, Ringelhan, [1984] ECR 3651, para 19; Case 
59/82, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v. Weinvertriebs-GmbH, [1983] ECR 
1217, para 11; Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours [1990] ECR I-889, para 14; Joined Cases C-1 
& 176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA and Publivía SAE v Departamento de Sanidad 
y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluña [1991] ECR I-4151). And only in the absence 
of harmonization (Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, supra note 185, at para 8).
187. Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v. Com-
missariaat voor de Media, [1991] ECR I-4007, at para 23. See also Case C-353/89, Commission 
v. the Netherlands, [1991] ECR I-4069, at para 30; C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Or-
ganisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media, [1993] ECR I-487, at paras. 9–10 and Case C-23/93, 
TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media, [1994] ECR I-4795, at paras. 18–19.
188. Graber, supra note 26, at p. 997.
189. Ibid., at p. 998.
190. Mueller, op. cit. supra note 3 at p. 322.
191. The impact study has pointed out that, “[t]he additional content requirements on broad-
casters to reflect linguistic or cultural specificities of a particular Member State, intentionally or 
otherwise, … act as barriers to cross-border trade in programmes and channels because (a) they 
set conditions on programme content that only domestic programme producers can meet; and 
(b) they lead to channel schedules that are specific to a Member State, thereby limiting the ap-
peal of these channels in other markets”. See Graham & Associates, supra note 111, at section 
6.4.3.
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We argue further that as parties to the UNESCO Convention on Cultural 
Diversity, the EC Member States and the European Community itself192 have 
clearly taken, if not legally binding obligations,193 at least an engagement 
with regard to the protection and promotion of cultural expressions and need 
to meet these aims.194 Indeed, first steps to the fulfilment of this commit-
ment are already discernible in the Commission’s recent Communication on 
a European agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World.195 It remains however 
to be seen whether and how exactly this ambitious, but still rather fuzzy, pro-
gramme196 is to be implemented in practice and whether it will effectively 
advance the diversity of cultural expressions in European audiovisual media 
(especially considering the extremely positive stance of the Communication 
towards the TVWF and its contribution “to the strengthening of media plural-
ism and cultural diversity”197).
192. The EC itself is a party to the Convention. See Council Decision of 18 May 2006 on 
the Conclusion of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, O.J. 2006, L 201/15.
193. See in particular Arts. 7–11 of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. For a 
critique of the lack of binding obligations in the Convention, see Acheson and Maule, “Conven-
tion on Cultural Diversity” (2004) Journal of Cultural Economics, 243–256.
194. This engagement has been reiterated in the AVMS. Recital 3(a) thereof states: “In its 
resolutions of 1 December 2005 and 4 April 2006 on the Doha Round and on the WTO Ministe-
rial Conferences, the European Parliament calls for basic public services, such as audiovisual 
services, to be excluded from liberalization under the GATS negotiations. In its resolution of 27 
April 2006, Parliament supports the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which states in particular that ‘cultural activities, goods 
and services have both an economic and a cultural nature, because they convey identities, values 
and meanings, and must therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value’. The Coun-
cil Decision of 18 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Convention on the Protection and Promo-
tion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions approved the UNESCO Convention on behalf of the 
Community. The Convention entered into force on 18 March 2007” (footnote omitted).
195. Commission communication on a European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World, 
COM(2007)242 final, 10 May 2007. See also Commission, “Inventory of Community Actions 
in the Field of Culture”, Accompanying Document to the Communication on a European Agenda 
for Culture in a Globalising World, SEC(2007)570, 10 May 2007.
196. Three interrelated sets of objectives are defined, to which all actors (the Member States 
and their regions, stakeholders in the field of culture and the Commission) are called upon to 
contribute. These sets of objectives encompass: (i) promotion of cultural diversity and intercul-
tural dialogue; (ii) promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon 
Strategy for growth and jobs; and (iii) promotion of culture as a vital element of the Union’s 
international relations. See Commission communication on a European Agenda for Culture in a 
Globalising World, ibid. at p. 8.
197. Ibid., at p. 10.
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7. Some concluding thoughts
A revision usually entails a correction, improvement and/or an update. The 
AVMS is an update but hardly an improvement on the previous TVWF re-
gime, in particular as far as its contribution to cultural diversity in the Eu-
ropean media is concerned. The AVMS also reveals that, at the Community 
level, as well as in the Member States, “[c]ultural policy making is in a pro-
found state of transition as the audiovisual sector moves from being a sepa-
rable and quarantined domain of governance to its enactment as part of a 
whole-of-government modelling in which it emerges as a service industry in 
a ‘digital economy’”.198 
When examining the provisions of the AVMS, we exposed a wide gap 
between the cultural diversity rhetoric and the real instruments put in place 
by the Community legislature. The lack of a clear and comprehensive vision 
of how to approach the new dynamic multi-faceted audiovisual environment 
and the misunderstanding and/or ignoring of new phenomena and processes 
is also apparent. This may have unexpected consequences in numerous direc-
tions, such as reduced creativity or wrong incentivizing of European con-
tent producers. Isolated actions such as the promotion of co-productions may 
have also dubious effects, and may even lead to a loss of cultural diversity as 
(i) producers focus on the lowest common cultural denominator and (ii) move 
from unique concepts to the development of formats for the global market-
place.199 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the EC legislature in its cultural policy 
endeavours still tends to stick to versions of international relations theory 
stressing the competitiveness of nations vis-à-vis others as the primary gover-
nance problem.200 The High Level Group on Audiovisual Policy was deeply 
convinced, for instance, that, “[a]t the heart of the matter is the question of 
whether the predicted explosion in demand for audiovisual material will be 
met by European productions or by imports. … The danger is that the chan-
nel proliferation brought about digital technology will lead to further market 
fragmentation, making it more difficult for European producers to compete 
with American imports”.201 To put it simply, we argued in contrast that cul-
tural diversity in European media is certainly not a question of whether the 
198. O’Regan and Goldsmith, “Making cultural policy: Meeting cultural objectives in a dig-
ital environment” (2006) Television and New Media, 68–91, at 88.
199. Horlings et al., supra note 1, at p. 56.
200. O’Regan and Goldsmith, supra note 198, at p. 69, referring to Schlesinger, “Television 
production, audio-visual policy and the creative industries”, paper presented at the Television; 
Past, Present and Future Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 3 Dec. 2000.
201. High Level Group on Audiovisual Policy, The Digital Age: European Audiovisual Poli-
cy, Chaired by Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, 26 Nov. 1998.
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European production of “Big Brother” will be replaced by a US production 
of “Big Sister”.
We deem that in its present form the AVMS, while securing a competitive 
environment and also providing for legal certainty for new media, does not 
actively contribute to the diversity of cultural expressions in European audio-
visual media. In the new audiovisual media landscape and taking account of 
the changed patterns of viewers’ and businesses’ behaviour, we see a set of 
new priorities emerging, which should be carefully considered and reflected 
in the overall Community framework of audiovisual media policy. In no par-
ticular order, these involve:
(i) making full use of the phenomena of digital media distribution and con-
tent creation in the sense of prolonging the “Long Tail”,202 which may include 
inter alia efforts to digitize all European content, facilitate the search of such 
content203 and create public awareness in this respect;
(ii) stimulating the Web 2.0 effects in user-generated content creation and 
harnessing the new creativity;
(iii) reducing the asymmetry of information between the digital “haves” 
and the digital “have-nots”: provision of diverse content in non-digitized form 
and active promotion of media literacy. The latter may be a vital asset to ac-
tively choosing, filtering, consuming and creating media, thus shaping com-
munication and culture;
(iv) rethinking the role of public service broadcasters in the new media set-
ting;
(v) creating proper incentives for the production of European works using 
criteria not simply based upon their origin.
Admittedly, the Community has been already taking steps in some of these 
directions (e.g. media literacy,204 content online205 and content production in 
202. See supra section 4.1.2.
203. See Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, “From Niches to Riches…” (supra note 131), who 
stress the importance of search as enhancing choice and prove that the facilitation of search 
changes the distribution of sales.
204. Recital 25(a) AVMS states that, “[m]edia literacy refers to skills, knowledge and under-
standing that allow consumers to use media effectively and safely. Media-literate people will be 
able to exercise informed choices, understand the nature of content and services and take advan-
tage of the full range of opportunities offered by new communications technologies. They will be 
better able to protect themselves and their families from harmful or offensive material. Therefore 
development of media literacy in all sections of society should be promoted and monitored”. See 
also Commission, “Making sense of today’s media content: Commission begins public media 
literacy consultation”, IP/06/1362, Brussels, 6 Oct. 2006. On the media literacy initiative, see 
also <ec.europa.eu/comm/avpolicy/media_literacy/ index_en.htm>.
205. See supra note 133. See also <ec.europa.eu/comm/avpolicy/other_actions/content_
online/index_en.htm#filmonline>.
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the framework of the Media 2007 programme206), but there is a significant 
lack of coherence and prioritization. We believe that, while “[c]oherence has 
never been the strongest aspect of EU audio-visual policy”,207 it may become 
indispensable in the new digital media environment.
206. Decision No 1718/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Nov. 
2006 Concerning the Implementation of a Programme of Support for the European Audiovisual 
Sector (MEDIA 2007), O.J. 2006, L 327/12.
207. Levy, supra note 25, at p. 40.
